Abstract: IPOs on the EuroNMs have shown very high underpricing. The majority of these IPOs possess specific characteristics such as lock-up agreements, venture-capital financing, ownership by the underwriter and over-allotment options. We study how these characteristics influence the underpricing of firms listed on the two largest EuroNM stock exchanges, the Neuer Markt of Germany and the Nouveau Marché of France. We find that the high underpricing in these two markets -contrary to the evidence on the US -is not driven by insiders' selling behaviour. However, the large underpricing is caused by the high degree of riskiness of the issuing firms and by the partial adjustment phenomenon of offer prices to compensate institutional investors for the truthful revelation of their demand for the shares. In contrast, venture-capital involvement does not affect underpricing. For France, lock-up agreements act as substitutes to underpricing, but not so for Germany. We also explore the reasons for the large difference in underpricing between the German and the French IPOs: German firms are more underpriced because they are more risky, have larger price revisions, have less stringent VC lock-up contracts and mostly go public during the hot issue period of 1999-2000 when the general level of underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher.
larger than those in France. This suggests that either the German investors were more forthcoming with information about the potential demand for shares enabling the firm's investment bank to set a more accurate price or they were overoptimistic about their national IPO market (or both). For France, lock-up agreements are a substitute for underpricing. The more stringent the lock-up, the smaller is the level of underpricing. In some firms, the underwriters are also shareholders in the firms they are taking public.
For Germany, this leads to higher underpricing whereas for France it has the opposite effect.
Finally, we study some of the reasons behind the large differences in underpricing between the two markets. We find that German IPOs are more underpriced because they are relatively riskier, are providing a larger compensation for the truthful revelation of information by potential investors, have less stringent VC lock-up contracts and mostly come to the market during the hot issue period of 1999-2000 when the average underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly discusses the creation (and demise) of the EuroNM markets and compares the characteristics of the two markets. Section III reviews the current literature on underpricing of European new markets. Section IV then discusses the determinants of underpricing and formulates the hypotheses, while section V specifies the data sources and describes the sample. Section VI documents the underpricing in the two EuroNMs and relates it to the IPO characteristics. Section VII discusses the results and section VIII concludes.
II The rise and fall of the EuroNMs
The European New Markets (EuroNMs) were launched in 1996/97 in order to facilitate the financing of innovative companies with a potential for high growth. Given that these firms were young and had no or little trading record, they were usually not able to meet the listing requirements of the primary markets. The French New Market (Nouveau Marché) was created first and commenced operating on 14 February 1996. At the end of 2001, the total market capitalization of the 164 companies listed on the Nouveau Marché amounts to 15 billion. The fact that some of its entry requirements were less strict, was compensated by other stricter requirements (see . For example there was no requirement in terms of past profitability, but there was a minimum lock-up period of six months (covering 100% of shares held by the insiders immediately after the IPO) or one year (covering 80% of the insiders' shares).
As a consequence of the increasing demand for equity investments in Germany, the The listing and disclosure requirements on the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marché were very similar. For example, for both markets the issuer was required to have at least 1.5m of equity capital. Both markets demanded that the minimum number of shares issued be at least 100,000 and the minimum market capitalization be at least 5m.
Further, for both markets, the issuers were asked to have a minimum free float of 20 per cent and at least half of the shares offered in the IPO had to be primary shares. Both markets required issuers to adopt the GAAP accounting standard and report quarterly accounts. However, in contrast to the Neuer Markt which had a six-month lock-up period covering all the insiders' shares, the Nouveau Marché locked up 80 per cent of the insiders' shares for a period of 12 months or 100 per cent of their shares for 6 months.
III. Literature review
The second half of the 1990s experienced the busiest IPO market in European history.
This was also the period of the birth of the EuroNMs. studied the underpricing of firms listed on all the EuroNMs. They found that underpricing in the different EuroNM markets was quite high and quite varied. For Germany, average underpricing was around 54% whereas for France it was around 25%. The Belgian and Italian IPOs had substantially lower underpricing with 10% and 19%, respectively.
Conversely, IPOs on the Dutch EuroNM were on average underpriced by about 86%.
The authors argued that the listing rules for the EuroNMs were more lenient than those for the main markets and this led to a more cautious setting of the offer price resulting in higher underpricing. Commenting on the differences in underpricing across the different EuroNM markets, the authors stated that the underpricing on Dutch EuroNM was higher because this market used fixed price offers as compared to book-built offers in other EuroNM markets. Giudici and Roosenboom (2004) also find that underpricing on the EuroNMs was considerably higher (about 22 percentage points) than that on the main market segments. They argue that the higher underpricing on the EuroNMs is partially due to reduced incentives to control wealth losses since the insiders sell fewer shares in the IPO. Other factors responsible for the higher underpricing are higher price revisions, the hot issue market and distinct firm characteristics. Arosio, Giudici and Paleari (2000) focus on the underpricing of internet stock IPOs on the EuroNMs. They find that underpricing is strongly related to the information gathered during the book-building process. They document that when the final offer price is set equal to the maximum of the initial price range, the level of underpricing is around 94% while there is no statistically significant underpricing if the final offer price is set equal to the minimum of the initial price range. Further, they report that underpricing is higher if the average first day return of previous IPOs has been higher. However, unlike Giudici and Roosenboom (2004) Franzke (2004) , Bessler and Kurth (2004) find that for those IPOs whose underwriting bank was also providing venture capital to the firm, the level of underpricing is much higher.
Even though some of the above papers analyse the underpricing of EuroNM IPOs, none of them investigates the causes for the high levels of underpricing and the reasons for the large difference in underpricing between the EuroNM markets. However, some recent studies of underpricing on the US markets during the dot com bubble do explain why the underpricing was so severe. For instance, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) document that, for a sample of internet IPOs during the years 1999-2000, the level of underpricing was 89%, about 5 times the level of the mid-1990s. They find that the high underpricing is partially due to marked changes in the pre-IPO ownership structure and the insider selling behaviour in the IPO. During the dot com bubble period, pre-IPO ownership was fragmented, the stakes of pre-IPO CEOs were half their former level, and the frequency and magnitude of secondary sales by all insiders was smaller. There were also larger price revisions.
In addition, Loughran and Ritter (2004) argue that part of the increase in underpricing of IPOs during the dot com bubble is attributable to the relatively higher risk of these firms, which gives support to the changing risk composition hypothesis. During the internet bubble period in the US, a high proportion of very young firms went public.
However, unlike Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) , Loughran and Ritter do not find a relation between the sale of secondary shares and underpricing. In fact, Loughran and Ritter find that CEO ownership, as measured by the dollar value of holdings at the offer price, was twice as high during the dot com bubble period as compared to earlier periods. They argue that this should have led to decreased underpricing during the bubble period. Instead, they attribute much of the higher underpricing during the bubble period to a changing issuer objective function and argue that during this period there was less focus on maximising IPO proceeds due to an increased emphasis on analyst coverage. Issuing firms were seeking to hire high reputation underwriters with highly ranked analysts even though if it came at the cost of higher underpricing (the analyst lust hypothesis). In addition, beginning in the 1990s, the underwriters were making side payments to the executives of the issuing firms in the form of share allocations in hot
IPOs. This practice created an incentive for the issuing firm's management to seek rather than avoid underwriters with a reputation of severe underpricing (the spinning hypothesis).
There are alternative explanations for the severe underpricing of US IPOs during the bubble period. For example, Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002) argue that issuers at the time of the bubble were willing to underprice more in order to generate an information momentum (by attracting attention to the stock) resulting in higher market prices at the end of the lock-up period when insiders typically sell some of their shares.
DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik (2002) state that high underpricing of internet IPOs was partly because of the media hype prior to the going-public.
IV. The determinants of underpricing
The theoretical literature on IPOs suggests a number of reasons for underpricing. For example, IPOs are underpriced because of underwriters' risk aversion, information asymmetry and the winner's curse, insurance against legal liabilities, and compensation to (institutional) investors for revealing truthful information about the demand for shares. 2 Below, we consider the determinants of underpricing in the context of the dot com bubble.
2 For a discussion of these and other reasons for underpricing, see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) . participation ratio which is defined as the number of secondary shares sold in the IPO divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the pre-IPO period. The dilution factor is defined as the number of primary shares issued in the IPO divided by the total number of shares outstanding before the IPO.
Ownership dilution and underpricing

Price revisions and underpricing
Once the underwriter discloses the indicative price range (the book-building range) for the issue, information on the potential demand of the issue is collected from investors
(for example through road shows). Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that potential investors need compensation for revealing truthful information about the demand of the issue. The underwriter will revise the price upwards if it receives favourable information from the investors. However, it will increase the issue price to a level below the 'fair price' suggested by the newly revealed information (the partial adjustment phenomenon). This causes underpricing which compensates the investors who revealed truthful information. In order to guarantee the disclosure of favourable information, the price adjustment that follows the revelation of bad news will be less substantial, resulting in less underpricing, than that following good news. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) make similar arguments.
Hypothesis 2: A higher positive price revision of the IPO leads to higher underpricing.
The price revision is measured as the percentage difference between the final offer price of the share and the mid-point of the book-building range.
Lock-up periods vs. underpricing Espenlaub et al. (2001) and Brau et al. (2004) For every shareholder of every firm in our sample, we do not only measure the length of the lock-up period but also the percentage of his/her shares locked up. We classify shareholders as insiders (executives and founder-owners), VCs, and outsiders (all other types of shareholders). A major difference between German and French minimum lockups is that the former apply to all the pre-IPO shareholders who still hold shares immediately after the IPO whereas the latter only apply to the insiders. For the German EuroNM IPOs, the minimum lock-up period is 6 months after the IPO. For all the aforementioned categories of shareholders, we calculate the percentage of post-IPO shares locked up for minimum requirement and locked-up beyond the minimum requirement.
IPOs on the Nouveau Marché can choose between two alternative minimum lock-up contracts: a lock-up of 100% of the shares for 6 months or of 80% of the shares for 12 months. Goergen et al. (2006) show that for France, these two minimum requirements
are not equivalent and that the longer contract -despite covering only 80% of the shares -is perceived as more stringent. Therefore, we calculate the percentage of post-IPO shares locked up at the first minimum requirement (6 months 100%), locked up at the second minimum requirement (1 year, 80%), and locked up beyond the two minimum requirements. In addition, for France, we also calculate the percentage of VC shares not locked up.
Underwriter's stake vs. underpricing
An interesting feature of the German and French EuroNM markets is that, in 15.47% of the German IPOs and 10.07% of the French ones, the underwriter hired by the issuer is also a pre-IPO shareholder. This creates an interesting dilemma for the underwriter: if the underwriter underprices the issue heavily, on the one hand it will incur a personal wealth loss on the share stake it is selling in the IPO, but on the other hand, the underpricing may generate repeat business from clients who have been allocated some of the underpriced shares. In contrast, if the underwriter's setting of the price only creates modest underpricing, its personal wealth loss will be relatively small and so will be the chances of repeat business. We arrive at the following two competing hypotheses: We measure the underwriter's ownership by the shareholding of the underwriter expressed as a percentage of the shares outstanding before the IPO.
In addition to the variables described above, we also use a number of control variables such as the volatility of the share price in the first month of trading (to capture the ex ante uncertainty of the firm), firm age, reputation of the underwriter 3 , a dummy variable capturing whether or not an overallotment option was present, and industry and time dummies. We also include lagged returns of the EuroNM All Share index (NEMAX ) measured over the quarter preceding the IPO in order to examine whether the degree of underpricing is correlated to past stock market movements (as do Loughran and Ritter 2002) . Table 1 summarises the hypotheses, the variables used and the predicted signs of their coefficients.
[Insert table 1 about here]
V. Data sources and sample description
We study the whole population of IPOs on the German Neuer Table 2 shows some of the characteristics of the IPOs on the German and French
EuroNMs. These firms are significantly younger than IPOs on the first and second-tier exchanges. For example, the average age of an IPO firm on the Neuer Markt is about 13 years whereas the average age of German IPOs on the Official and Regulated Markets is more than 49 years . For the Nouveau Marché, the average age of IPOs is about 11 years compared to 30 years for IPOs on other French markets (Chahine 2004) . The market capitalization of the average French IPO is about 4 times smaller than the average German IPO (the difference is significant at the 5% level). In both markets venture capitalists have a strong presence with nearly 47% of the German firms and 57% of the French firms having at least one VC among their shareholders (the difference is significant at the 5% level). Interestingly, the average length of lock-up agreements for both the markets is similar (around 10 months) despite the different rules on the minimum lock-up length.
[ Insert table 2 Germany where about 90% of IPOs use them as compared to less than half in France (the difference is significant at the 5% level).
The German and French EuroNM IPOs also differ in terms of their timing. The majority of IPOs in the German EuroNM went public at the climax of the dot com bubble years (1999 and 2000) whereas only about half of the French IPOs were floated in those years (the difference is significant at the 5% level). Finally, the owners of the German IPOs sell a higher fraction of their holdings (as the issue participation ratio is 9.26%) in comparison to their French counterparts which have an average issue participation ratio of 6.54% (the difference is significant at the 5% level). In addition, the dilution factor in Germany (34%) is also higher than that in France (32%), the difference being significant at the 5% level. Hence, for both markets the existing owners saw on average one third of their ownership being diluted as a result of primary shares sold in the IPO. A closer look at the quarterly and yearly underpricing yields some interesting facts.
VI. Underpricing in the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marché
Underpricing in both markets is cyclical in nature (see figure 1 ). For Germany, the initial returns for the first quarter of any year (except for 1997) are always substantially higher than those for any of the other quarters of the same year. For France, this pattern is somewhat less pronounced. For Germany, the level of underpricing surges abruptly from about 34% in 1997 to about 74% in 1998 and averages 51% in subsequent years.
Overall, the yearly (average and median) underpricing for Germany is always significantly higher than that for France.
[Insert figure 1 about here]
Underpricing by industry
Panel A of table 4 shows a cross-sectional analysis of IPO underpricing by industry. Table 5 shows the underpricing for firms with below and abovemedian participation and dilution ratios. Whereas underpricing significantly differs between firms with above-median and below median issue participation/dilution ratios and also across the two countries, we do not find a relationship between underpricing and the level of insider participation or the dilution of their ownership at the flotation.
[Insert table 5 about here] the VC is a member of both the supervisory and the management board. Even though a quarter of the German VC-backed firms and around 60% of the French VC-backed 6 For example, Gold-Zack AG is a member of the German VC association only and has been classified as a domestic VC. Advent International is not a member of the German VC association but is a member of VC associations of 6 other countries and hence is classified as an international VC. Similarly for the French market, Banque De Vizille is a member of the French VC association only and is thus considered as domestic, whereas Innovacom is an international VC as it is a member of both the French and EU VC associations.
VCs and Underpricing
firms have VCs on the supervisory board, underpricing (both mean and median) in these IPOs is not statistically different from those IPOs without VC representation. However, for Germany, we still find a large economic difference in underpricing between the two types of IPOs (Table 7) .
To summarise, VCs do not seem to have an impact on the underpricing of IPOs in both EuroNM markets and therefore the validity of the hypothesis that VC backing signals quality is not corroborated for the EuroNM markets.
The timing of Neuer Market IPOs and underpricing
One interesting aspect of IPOs that usually goes unnoticed is their timing. Not all the firms go public on the initially announced date. For the German EuroNMs, we are able to collect information on the announcement dates for 133 IPOs. Out of these, 11 IPOs go public earlier than planned, 95 are floated as scheduled and 27 IPOs (around 20%)
are postponed at least once 7 . All the postponed (but eventually successful) IPOs are either from the Manufacturing or the Business Services industry. Table 8 IPOs show relatively smaller underpricing than those which are on-time. However, the difference in underpricing (both mean and median) is not statistically significant. 7 We do not have similar information on the IPOs on the French EuroNM and are therefore able not analyse the timing on the French market. 8 For any of the above three categories of IPOs, the average time period between the first announcement and the actual date of IPO is around 17 to 20 days.
The average number of IPOs in the month preceding the announcement of the flotation is similar for all the three types of IPOs. Hence, the IPO activity in the market prior to the announcement of the flotation date does not seem to influence the flotation decision.
However, the level of underpricing in the month preceding earlier IPOs is very high compared to that preceding IPOs that are on-time or are postponed. It may be that the observed large underpricing is interpreted by potential IPO candidates as a signal of high demand for IPO shares in the market, which then triggers the decision to float their IPO earlier than planned. In the same vein, issuers seem to postpone their IPOs if the feedback from the market is not positive, i.e. if the level of underpricing in the market is lower. Table 8 confirms that the level of underpricing in the month preceding postponed
IPOs is considerably lower than that of earlier IPOs 9 .
VII. Regression analysis
Models 1 and 2 of Table 9 explain the underpricing in the German and French EuroNM IPOs, respectively. For Model 2, we only consider French IPOs after 1 December 1998
as, prior to this date, all insiders were required to be locked up for three years with 80% of their holdings. Given that the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marché both started around the same time, were members of the same EuroNM network with similar listing rules and had a number of similar firm characteristics such as age, VC backing, lock-up agreements and the use of the book building procedure, the large difference in underpricing between the two markets is intriguing. Model 3 explains the difference in underpricing between the two countries.
Unlike the evidence from US IPOs, we do not find a statistically significant relation between the changes in insider ownership concentration and underpricing. The coefficients on the issue participation ratio and dilution factor are statistically significant for neither the German nor the French markets. Thus, Habib and Ljungqvist's (2001) assertion that the insiders set the offer price to minimise wealth losses in the IPO is not supported for these markets and we do not find support for Hypothesis 1. 9 The difference in means is not statistically significant. This could be because of the small sample size for earlier and postponed IPOs. However, the difference in medians (71.79% for earlier IPOs and 41.05% for postponed IPOs) is statistically significant at the 10% level.
[Insert table 9 about here]
We find that underpricing is positively related to the price revision. The higher the price revision, the higher is the level of underpricing. Therefore, we find support for Benveniste and Spindt's (1989) We find that the fact that an underwriter is also a shareholder affects the level of underpricing. For German IPOs with a shareholder-underwriter, the larger the number of pre-IPO shares owned by the underwriter, the larger is the underpricing. In contrast, this relation is negative for the French IPOs. These results suggest that the German and
French underwriters have conflicting views on the wealth loss caused by the underpricing and the benefits from obtaining future business. Even though the German underwriters sell a relatively higher proportion of their holdings in the IPO 11 , for them 10 It is somewhat puzzling that if the outsiders (apart from the VCs) are locked-up beyond the two minimums, the level of underpricing is larger. However, there are only 9 out of 61 firms with outsiders locked up beyond the two minimum requirements. 11 The selling behaviour of the German and French underwriters was quite different. For 30% of the German IPOs whose underwriter was also a shareholder, the underwriter did not sell any shares, whereas in nearly half of the IPOs, the underwriter sold more than 30% and in 16% of the IPOs the underwriter sold all its shares. In contrast, for the French IPOs whose underwriter was also a shareholder, in nearly underpricing is an acceptable price to pay in order to secure a higher volume of future business and a high probability of a successful issue. The French underwriters provide evidence of the opposite behaviour. Therefore, we obtain support for Hypothesis 4a for Germany and for hypothesis 4b for France.
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When we control for the ex-ante uncertainty in the IPOs, we find that the higher the volatility of the share price, the larger is the level of underpricing. The results are highly significant and similar for both markets. Therefore, riskier firms are more underpriced.
For Germany, we do not find any relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing. 13 Further, the size of the issuer, the presence of an over-allotment option and the age of the IPO firms do not have any impact on underpricing.
For Germany, past market movements also have an impact on the level of underpricing.
The higher the market return in the quarter prior to the IPO, the higher is the Finally, model 3 estimates the determinants of the differences in the level of underpricing between the two countries. To study the reasons for the difference in underpricing between the two markets, we match the German and French firms first by industry (using two digit SIC codes) and then by size (to the nearest 1,000,000 for small firms and 5,000,000 for large firms) using the market capitalisation at the offer price. We are able to match all the 61 French firms using these two criteria. The last column of Table 9 reports the results from an OLS regression with the difference in half of these IPOs the underwriters did not sell any of their shares and in only 16% of the IPOs the underwriter sold more than 30%. There were no IPOs in which the underwriter sold all of its shares. 12 The difference in the impact of shareholder-underwriters on underpricing is not caused by differences in the market momentum as the coefficient on the interaction term between the two variables is not significantly different from zero. 13 Franzke (2004) Conversely, the difference in the level of price revisions between the markets explains the difference in underpricing. From Table 2 , we know that the average price revision in
Germany is almost twice that in France. Table 9 confirms that the larger the difference in the price revision, the larger is the difference in underpricing.
The difference in the stringency of VC lock-up agreements in terms of length and the percentage of shares locked up explains the differences in underpricing between
Germany and France. The German IPOs show higher underpricing because a relatively smaller percentage of VC shares are locked up beyond the minimum requirement.
Indeed, Goergen et al. (2006) show that only 33% of the VC shares are locked up beyond the minimum requirement in Germany compared to 60% in France. The difference in the lock-up contracts of insiders and that for outsiders other than VCs do not explain the difference in underpricing between the two markets.
The difference in the level of pre-IPO ownership by underwriters in the two countries does not explain the large difference in underpricing between the two markets.
However, the difference in ex-ante uncertainty -the average volatility of German IPOs is around 15.14% as compared to only 5.00% for French IPOs -is one of the main reasons for the difference in underpricing.
Finally, the frequent use of over-allotment options in the German firms (89% of IPOs have Greenshoe options in Germany as compared to only 46% of IPOs in France) does not explain the large difference in underpricing between the two countries. Likewise, the age difference between the matched pairs of German and French firms also fails to explain the difference in underpricing.
VIII. Conclusion
IPOs on the EuroNMs are characterised by the presence of lock-up agreements, the use of the book-building procedure for their valuation, venture-capital backing, the existence of over-allotment options and high levels of underpricing. In this paper, we first document some of these idiosyncrasies and then focus on how -if at all -they influence the level of underpricing in the two largest members of EuroNM network, namely the Neuer Markt of Germany and Nouveau Marché of France.
We find that all IPOs (except for one German IPO) use the book building procedure for their pricing. IPOs from both markets have lock-up periods in place which exceed the compulsory minimum. We also find that IPOs from these two markets are venture- when the general level of underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher. Age is calculated as the number of full years between the year of foundation and the year of the flotation. Market capitalization is measured at the end of the first day of trading. Price revision is the ratio of the difference between the offer price and the mid point of the bookbuilding range divided by the mid point of the book-building range. Overallotment options allow underwriters to purchase up to 15% additional shares beyond the number of registered shares in an IPO. The issue participation ratio is the number of secondary shares sold at the time of the IPO normalised by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. The dilution factor is the number of primary shares issued normalised by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. *, **, and *** stand for the statistical significance of the t-test on difference in means between Germany and France at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, of the two-tailed test.
, and +++ stand for the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively of the two-tailed Z-test for the equality between two proportions from two samples, assuming a binomial distribution. Under the null hypothesis that the two proportions are identical, Z is approximately distributed as a standard normal deviate (Kanji, 1995) .
Germany France
Age ( The first figure in parentheses is the median value, the second figure is the sample size and the third figure is the percentage of positive observations. *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance of the t-test on the difference in means between Germany and France at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, of the two-tailed test. Panel A provides the frequency of different types of large shareholders in the pre-IPO period. The issue participation ratio is the number of secondary shares sold at the time of the IPO normalised by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. The dilution factor is the number of primary shares issued normalised by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding.
+ stands for the statistical significance at the 10%, respectively of the two-tailed Z-test for the equality between two proportions from two samples, assuming a binomial distribution. Under the null hypothesis that the two proportions are identical, Z is approximately distributed as a standard normal deviate (Kanji, 1995) . *** stands for the statistical significance of the t-test on difference in means between Germany and France at the 1% level, of the twotailed test. stand for the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively of the two-tailed Z-test for the equality between two proportions from two samples, assuming a binomial distribution. Under the null hypothesis that the two proportions are identical, Z is approximately distributed as a standard normal deviate (Kanji, 1995 The first figure in parentheses is the median value, the second figure is the sample size and the third figure is the percentage of positive observations. *** stands for the statistical significance of the t-test on difference in means between Germany and France at the 1% level of the two-tailed test. The difference of medians is tested by the two-tailed Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test which tests for a difference between the medians of 2 independent samples with similar shape distributions. Domestic VCs are members of the domestic VC association only. International VCs are those who are members of at least one VC association; they may or may not be a member of their domestic VC association. Earlier are those IPOs that are brought to the market prior to the intended date. On-time are those IPOs which are brought to the market on the intended date. Postponed are IPOs that were postponed at least once. Franzke's (2004) method is used to measure underwriter reputation. The higher the value, the better the underwriter reputation. The average market return is the return on the EuroNM All Share index (NEMAX) in the month before the first announcement day of the IPO. The numbers in brackets represent the minimum, maximum, median and standard deviation. Information on the announcement dates of only 133 IPOs was available. The dependent variable is the natural log of the first day return. The issue participation ratio is the number of secondary shares sold at the IPO divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the pre-IPO period. The dilution factor is the number of primary shares issued at the IPO divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the pre-IPO period. Price revision is the percentage difference between the final offer price of the share and the mid-point of the book-building range. For France there is a choice between two minimum lock up contracts, 100% of the shares locked up for 6 months (first minimum requirement) or 80% locked up for 12 months (second minimum requirement). For Germany the minimum requirement is 100% of the shares locked-up for 6 months. Insider shares refer to the shares held by the executives and founder-owners. % shares owned by the underwriter are for the pre-IPO period. Volatility of the stock price measures the standard deviation of share returns over the first month of trading. Underwriter reputation for Germany is measured as in Franzke (2004) . No such measure is available for France. Size is measured as the natural log of the market capitalisation at the offer price. Greenshoe is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an over-allotment option is present in the IPO and zero otherwise. Models 1 and 2 study the underpricing in Germany and France, respectively. Model 3 studies the difference in underpricing between the two countries. Model 2 considers French firms that came for an IPO after 1 December 1998. Before this period all insiders were locked-up for three years for 80% of their holdings. The figures in parentheses are the t-stats. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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